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Chapter 1: Animal Ethics1 
Clare Palmer (Texas A&M University, USA), Peter Sandøe (University of Copenhagen, Denmark) 
 
Abstract 
This chapter describes and discusses different views concerning our duties towards animals. First, we explain 
why it is necessary to engage in thinking about animal ethics and why it is not enough to rely on feelings 
alone. Secondly, we present and discuss five different kinds of views about the nature of our duties to 
animals. They are: contractarianism, utilitarianism, the animal rights view, contextual views, and a respect 
for nature view. Finally, we briefly consider whether it is possible to combine elements from the presented 
views, and how to make up one’s mind. 
 
1. Introduction:  The need to give reasons for one’s ethical views 
This chapter describes and discusses different views on right and wrong in our dealings with 
animals. What might be right or wrong is not a factual question, and therefore cannot be settled by 
the same methods as those used in biology and other natural sciences. Some readers of this chapter 
may even wonder whether moral issues can be settled at all; rather they may be seen as matters 
purely of feeling or taste. We’ll suggest below that this position is problematic. 
The primary focus of this book is to discuss factual issues relating to the way animals are used and 
treated by humans. Until recently ethics was seen as something that should be kept at arm’s length 
from the fact-oriented science based study of animal welfare: only once the facts are established 
would it be appropriate to discuss, from an ethical perspective, where to draw the line between what 
is acceptable and what is not.  
But the link between factual knowledge and sound ethical judgement is not that simple - often the 
study of the facts relies on tacit ethical judgements. For example, studying the consequences for 
animal welfare of various ways of housing farm animals proceeds on the assumption that it is 
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acceptable to use animals for food production as long as the animals do not suffer from bad welfare. 
And assessments of animal welfare rely on assumptions regarding what matters, ethically speaking, 
in our dealings with animals. Is it to avoid pain and other forms of suffering? Is it to give pleasure 
and other positive emotion? Or to allow animals to live natural lives? To be able to deal with such 
questions and to justify the tacit judgments underlying studies of animal welfare we need not only 
to know the facts but to engage with and be proficient in ethical thinking.  
This chapter focuses on possible answers to basic ethical questions about animal ethics: Do animals 
have moral standing in their own right? And if so, what kind of duties do we have towards them? 
Does it matter whether animals are wild or domesticated? Do we only have obligations to individual 
animals or also to species or populations of animals? How should we balance our duties to animals 
against other kinds of duties? We do not attempt to answer these questions. Rather, we take a 
pluralist approach to animal ethics, presenting five diverse ethical positions, each with its own 
answers. We do not side with any of these views, but we encourage the reader to consider their 
strong points and why people have been drawn to them. Although we (as authors of this chapter) 
have our own views, we have tried to present the arguments in a balanced way (though we may not 
have always succeeded in concealing our sympathies).  
However, we do take the view that it’s important to adopt a reasoned approach to animal ethics, 
rather than one based on feelings alone. Reliance on feelings makes for difficulty in entering ethical 
debates, and in explaining to others why particular attitudes or practices are either problematic or 
beneficial. And for animal professionals to be taken seriously by people who hold different views, 
they must show that they can comprehend the nature of disagreements about animal ethics. This 
entails understanding why people make the moral judgments they do.   
But what are moral judgements? They do not seem to be just statements of personal taste. The 
philosopher James Rachels (1993, p.10) suggests: 
If someone says “I like coffee,” he does not need to have a reason - he is merely making a 
statement about himself, and nothing more. There is no such thing as “rationally defending” 
one’s like or dislike of coffee, and so there is no arguing about it. So long as he is accurately 
reporting his tastes, what he says must be true. Moreover, there is no implication that anyone 
should feel the same way; if everyone else in the world hates coffee, it doesn’t matter. On the 
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other hand, if someone says that something is morally wrong, he does need reasons, and if his 
reasons are sound, other people must acknowledge their force. 
Here, Rachels points out the importance of being able to give reasons to justify our ethical views. A 
consequence of the requirement to give reasons is a requirement of consistency: If something 
provides a moral reason in one case it should also count as a reason in other, similar cases. We can 
see this process of reasoning by appeal to consistency in the following famous passage, first 
published in 1789 (pp. 25-6), where Jeremy Bentham argues that animals ought to be protected by 
the law: 
The day may come, when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never 
could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already 
discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason why a human being should be 
abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor. It may come one day to be 
recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os 
sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. 
What else is it that should trace the insuperable line? Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, 
the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, 
as well as a more conversible animal, than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. 
But suppose the case were otherwise what would it avail? The question is not, Can they 
reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer? 
Bentham asks the reader to consider on what grounds legal rights (for instance, legal protection 
against torture) are assigned to people. We now accept that factors such as skin colour are irrelevant 
to the possession of basic legal rights. But what, then, is the relevant factor? One possible answer, 
Bentham suggests, is the ability to reason and to use language. So, it might be suggested that reason 
and language provide a basis for separating humans and animals, and for assigning legal rights to 
humans, and not to animals. But Bentham raises a number of questions about this kind of response. 
First: why think that reason and language are relevant to the generation of legal rights (any more 
than, say, skin colour)? Second: some animals do appear to have reasoning abilities. And third: 
Some animals are at least as reasonable as some people – as human infants, or those who have 
severe mental disabilities – so reason and language do not obviously provide the suggested firm 
dividing line between all people and all animals. 
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Bentham makes us consider whether it is possible to argue consistently that all humans should be 
treated in one way, and all animals in another. The first of the five views presented below maintains 
that we can, indeed, consistently distinguish morally between animals and humans. 
 
2. Five views about humanity’s duties to animals  
Moral philosophers distinguish a number of types of ethical theory, and in principle any of these 
might underlie a person’s views about the acceptable use of animals. Here five prominent 
theoretical positions will be presented: contractarianism, utilitarianism, an animal rights view, 
contextual views, and a respect for nature view. These have direct implications for the ongoing 
debate over animal use.  
 
2.1 Contractarianism 
Why be moral? This is a central question in moral philosophy, and one to which the contractarian 
gives a straightforward answer: you should be moral because it is in your self-interest. Showing 
consideration to others is really for your own sake. Moral rules are conventions that best serve the 
self-interest of all members of the society.  
Contractarian morality as here defined (the term may also be used of other views that we don’t 
discuss here) applies only to individuals who can ‘contract in’ to the moral community, so it is 
important to define who these members are. The philosopher Narveson puts this as follows:  
On the contract view of morality, morality is a sort of agreement among rational, 
independent, self-interested persons, persons who have something to gain from entering 
into such an agreement […] 
A major feature of this view of morality is that it explains why we have it and who is party 
to it. We have it for reasons of long-term self-interest, and parties to it include all and only 
those who have both of the following characteristics: 1) they stand to gain by subscribing 
to it, at least in the long run, compared with not doing so, and 2) they are capable of 
entering into (and keeping) an agreement. […] Given these requirements, it will be clear 
why animals do not have rights. For there are evident shortcomings on both scores. On the 
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one hand, humans have nothing generally to gain by voluntarily refraining from (for 
instance) killing animals or ‘treating them as mere means’. And on the other, animals 
cannot generally make agreements with us anyway, even if we wanted to have them do 
so… 
(Narveson 1983, p.56)  
So, on this view, people are dependent on the respect and cooperation of other people. If 
someone treats fellow humans badly, he or she will be treated badly in return. In contrast, the 
animal community will not strike back if, for example, some of its members are used in painful 
experiments. So, a person needs only to treat animals well enough for them to be fit for his or her 
own purposes. 
As non-human animals cannot enter into a contract, or agreement, governing future conduct, they 
cannot, according to the contractarian view, join the moral community. On this view, any kind of 
animal use may be desirable inasmuch as it brings human benefits, such as income, desirable food, 
and new medical treatments.  
That animals are not members of the moral community does not necessarily mean that their 
treatment is irrelevant from the contractarian perspective: if people like animals, for example, 
animal use can become important, since it is in a person’s interests to get what he or she likes. But 
the contractarian view of animals is human-centred; any protection animals have will always 
depend on, and be secondary to, human concerns. A further implication is that on this view, it 
would be likely that levels of protection would differ across animal species. Since most people like 
cats and dogs more than rats and mice, causing distress to cats and dogs is likely to turn out to be 
a more serious problem than causing the same amount of distress to rats and mice.  
This contractarian view accords with attitudes to animal treatment that are common in many 
societies. But it raises many problems. Is causing animals to suffer for a trivial reason really morally 
unproblematic, if no human being cares? After all, some humans – small children, for instance -
also can’t behave in reciprocal ways, or make contracts with other people. Would it be morally 
acceptable to eat or experiment on them, if other human contractors didn’t object? Many people 
consider that it’s immoral as such to cause another to suffer for little or no reason, whether one’s 
victim is a human being or an animal. An ethical theory that captures this view is utilitarianism. 
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Utilitarian ethical theory provides probably the most well-known approach to animal ethics. 
Utilitarianism is consequentialist in form: that is, only consequences are important when making 
ethical decisions, and we should always aim at bringing about the best possible consequences. But 
what counts as the best possible consequences? Here, forms of utilitarianism diverge. One leading 
form – promoted by Jeremy Bentham – maintains that consequences should be measured in terms 
of maximizing pleasures and minimizing pains. If animals feel pain and pleasure, then they should 
be included in our calculations about what to do. Indeed, on this view, there’s no reason to privilege 
human pain over animal pain. Pain is pain, wherever it occurs.  So a certain kind of equality is very 
important: the pains of every being should be taken equally into account, whatever the species of 
the being concerned.  
In recent animal ethics, this view has been most forcefully defended by the philosopher Peter Singer 
(1989, pp 152). Singer uses the language of interests in outlining his position: if a being can suffer, 
it has an interest in avoiding suffering, and its interests should be treated equally to the similar 
interests of other beings, whether they are human or not: 
I am urging that we extend to other species the basic principle of equality that most of us 
recognize should be extended to all members of our own species. ...Jeremy Bentham 
incorporated the essential basis of moral equality into his utilitarian system of ethics in the 
formula: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.” In other words, the interests of 
every being affected by an action are to be taken into account and given the same weight as 
the like interests of any other being…. The racist violates the principle of equality by giving 
greater weight to the interests of members of his own race, when there is a clash between their 
interests and the interests of those of another race. Similarly the speciesist allows the interests 
of his own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is 
the same in each case. 
For the utilitarian, what matters are the interests of those affected by our actions- not the race or the 
species of the beings who have the interests. The strongest interests should prevail no matter who 
has them. This view can have radical consequences. Take modern intensive livestock production. 
Broiler chickens and animals in confined feeding operations often suffer. Some basic interests of 
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these animals are set aside so that production is efficient and meat is cheap. But for affluent 
individuals cheap meat is not a basic interest; in a country such as Denmark ordinary consumers 
only spend around 10 % of their disposable income on food. If such consumers paid 30% or 50% 
more, and the extra money was used to improve the living conditions of the animals, this would 
mean an immense increase in welfare and a substantial reduction in suffering, without significantly 
decreasing human welfare. Therefore, according to the utilitarian view, we ought to make radical 
changes in the treatment of intensively farmed animals.  
Indeed, Singer (1979, p.152) argues that we should become vegetarians, because consumption of 
meat and other products from commercially reared animals creates animal suffering that isn’t 
outweighed by the human pleasure it generates. (There are also other utilitarian arguments in favour 
of reducing meat consumption based on the negative consequences for sentient beings from the 
effects of meat production on the environment, on climate and on resource use.) 
However, utilitarianism does not endorse a principle that killing animals is wrong. Killing is 
certainly likely to be morally problematic for two reasons: it may cause suffering, and once a being 
is killed, it can no longer have positive experiences. So, killing may both increase suffering and 
reduce pleasure in the world. But it need not.  As Singer says: “It is not wrong to rear and kill it [an 
animal] for food, provided that it lives a pleasant life, and after being killed will be replaced by 
another animal which will lead a similarly pleasant life and would not have existed if the first 
animal had not been killed. This means that vegetarianism is not obligatory for those who can 
obtain meat from animals that they know to have been reared in this manner”.(Singer 1979:, p.153) 
This utilitarian view on killing animals may give rise to worries which are animated by Michael 
Lockwood’s (1979: 168) troublesome (fictional) case, Disposapup:  
Many families, especially ones with young children, find that dogs are an asset when they are 
still playful puppies…,but become an increasing liability as they grow into middle age, with 
an adult appetite but sans youthful allure. Moreover, there is always a problem of what to do 
with the animal when they go on holiday. It is often inconvenient or even impossible to take 
the dog with them, whereas friends tend to resent the imposition, and kennels are expensive 
and unreliable. Let us suppose that, inspired by Singer’s article, people were to hit on the idea 
of having their pets painlessly put down at the start of each holiday (as some pet owners 
already do), acquiring new ones upon their return. Suppose, indeed, that a company grows up, 
‘Disposapup Ltd’, which rears the animals, house-trains them, supplies them to any willing 
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purchaser, takes them back, exterminates them and supplies replacements, on demand. It is 
clear, is it not, that there can, for Singer, be absolutely nothing directly wrong with such a 
practice. Every puppy has, we may assume, an extremely happy, albeit brief, life - and indeed, 
would not have existed at all but for the practice. 
Some people may, after thinking a bit, accept that it is in principle acceptable to replace dogs in this 
way. However, they will then have to face a further, related problem:  the apparent implication that 
we can painlessly kill humans, if we create new humans to replace them! This difficulty has led 
some utilitarians – including Singer himself – to make a further distinction, based on the possession 
of self-consciousness. Although it’s difficult to define self-consciousness, some utilitarians have 
maintained that a self-conscious being is one that has a preference or a desire to go on living, and 
that the frustration of such basic desires is morally relevant. They argue that (either in addition to, 
or instead of) minimizing pain, we should minimize the frustration of desires in the world, 
especially the frustration of that most basic desire of a self-conscious creature - the desire to go on 
living.  
However, this does not really seem to solve the problem. For  it sounds as though, in principle, it 
would be morally permissible to painlessly kill a self-conscious human if the human were replaced 
by another human who lives a better life than the first (to make up for the loss incurred by the 
killing)  and who would not otherwise have existed. Admittedly, the utilitarian may argue that 
killing humans and animals has very different consequences. Killing humans usually has negative 
emotional and social effects on survivors in a way that killing animals doesn’t. However, to say that 
the wrong in painlessly killing humans lies in effects on other people may reasonably be regarded as 
missing the point.  
Singer himself, in his book Practical Ethics,  argues that the creation of a new desire to live cannot 
be weighed against the frustration of someone else’s desire to go on living – that is, that preferences 
are not substitutable in this way. However, this starts to move away from some of the fundamental 
calculative elements of utilitarianism, since it suggests that there are some goods (such as a desire to 
go on living) that just can’t be compensated for by the creation of more of the same goods (more 
desires to live). In fact, this kind of view – that some harms are just unacceptable, whatever the 
ensuing benefits – is much more closely associated with a different approach to animal ethics: a 
rights view. 
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2.3 The animal rights view 
We can think about rights in two senses: legal and moral. Legal rights are rights that are created and 
that exist within legal systems. Moral rights, though, are not created by the law; those who argue 
from a moral rights-based perspective give a variety of different accounts of the origin of rights. 
One traditional - though now controversial -  claim depends on the intuition that humans naturally 
have rights; to be a rights-holder is just part of what it is to be human.  
Claims about rights are particularly important here for two reasons. First is the special force that 
rights language carries. Although the term ‘rights’ is sometimes loosely used just to mean having 
moral status (it’s in this loose sense that Singer is sometimes called the “father of animal rights”)  
philosophers generally understand rights in a more restricted sense. In this restricted sense, to say 
that a being has moral rights is to make a very strong claim that those rights should be protected or 
promoted. Indeed, sometimes possessing a right is described as having a ‘trump card’ – the kind of 
claim that wins out over any competing claims. Second is the fact that some philosophers have 
extended the idea of moral rights beyond humans, arguing that animals also have moral rights. After 
all, such philosophers argue, it’s not just being biologically human – a member of the species Homo 
sapiens – that gives a being rights. Rather, it must be the possession of particular capacities (such as 
sentience or self-awareness) that one has as a species-member that underpins humans’ rights. But if 
it’s capacities, not genes, on which rights possession is based, then perhaps some animals share the 
relevant basic capacities, and should be thought of as having rights? It’s this view that’s adopted by 
animal rights advocates, most prominently the philosopher Tom Regan in  The Case for Animal 
Rights (1984).   
Regan (2007, p.209) argues that all “experiencing subjects of a life” should be thought of as 
possessing moral rights. An experiencing subject of a life is “a conscious creature having an 
individual welfare that has importance to it whatever its usefulness to others”. Such beings “want 
and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things”. They can undergo pleasure and 
pain, experience satisfaction and frustration, and have a sense of themselves as beings that persist 
over time. Such beings have, on his account, inherent value of their own, based on their nature and 
capacities. They are not instruments for someone else’s use and benefit. Inherent value, Regan 
maintains, can’t be traded off, factored into calculations about consequences, or replaced. Creatures 
that possess it – and Regan argues that all mentally normal adult mammals fall into this category –  
have basic moral rights, including the right to life and to liberty. The evidence that infant mammals, 
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birds, fish, reptiles and some invertebrates are experiencing subjects of a life is less clear. However, 
since we cannot be sure about their inner worlds, Regan (184 p.416) argues that we should give 
them the benefit of the doubt in moral decision-making, since they too may have inherent value.  
Regan explicitly sets up his rights view in opposition to utilitarianism. Utilitarians, he maintains, are 
fundamentally mistaken in thinking that harming some beings to bring about good consequences for 
others is morally acceptable. On the contrary: “That would be to sanction the disrespectful 
treatment of the individual in the name of the social good, something the rights view will not - 
categorically will not - ever allow.” So utilitarian and rights views will, in some cases, diverge in 
practice – and they will always diverge in principle. Regan, for instance, comments on animal 
experimentation and commercial animal agriculture: 
The rights view is categorically abolitionist. Lab animals are not our tasters; we are not their 
kings. Because these animals are treated routinely, systematically as if their value were 
reducible to their usefulness to others, they are routinely, systematically treated with lack of 
respect, and thus are their rights routinely, systematically violated.…As for commercial animal 
agriculture, the rights view takes a similar abolitionist position. The fundamental moral wrong 
here is not that animals are kept in stressful close confinement or in isolation, or that their pain 
and suffering, their needs and preferences are ignored or discounted. All these are wrong, of 
course, but they are not the fundamental wrong. They are symptoms and effects of the deeper, 
systematic wrong that allows these animals to be viewed and treated as lacking independent 
value, as resources for us - as, indeed, a renewable resource. (Regan 2007, p.210) 
Of course, sometimes the judgments of a utilitarian and a rights theorist about particular cases of 
experimentation or commercial animal agriculture will coincide: some animal experimentation, and 
most commercial animal agriculture as currently practised, should consistently be condemned by 
both. But the underlying reasons for these judgments differ. A utilitarian is primarily concerned 
about suffering or desire-frustration in cases where the benefits derived do not seem to outweigh the 
costs. In contrast, a rights theorist is concerned about failing to respect animals’ inherent value, and 
violating animals’ rights, irrespective of potential good consequences.  From the rights perspective, 
the utilitarian idea that the interest of an animal in continuing to live may be outweighed by 
conflicting interests, i.e. the combined interests of the future animal which will replace it and human 
interests in animal production, is morally abhorrent. So a rights view is abolitionist, whereas in 
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contrast a utilitarian will ask questions about the benefits of any particular practice involving 
suffering to animals before coming to a view about its moral permissibility. 
On Regan’s rights view, killing – even where it is painless and another being is created – harms the 
being that is killed. Regan (1984, p.99) describes killing as harm by deprivation – an animal that is 
killed is deprived of all the goods that the rest of its life would otherwise have contained, even if its 
death is sudden and unanticipated. Indeed, to kill an experiencing subject of a life is to display 
ultimate disrespect, by destroying the animal’s inherent value, and thus violating its rights.  
An animal rights view such as Regan’s– though providing a plausible alternative to utilitarianism – 
generates its own difficulties. One problem concerns how to handle rights conflicts. For example, it 
may be difficult to combine respect for the rights of all rodents with the aim of securing human 
health and welfare. If these “pests” are not “controlled” they may pose a threat because they eat our 
food, and because they spread disease. It seems to be either them or us. What has the rights view to 
say about this?  
Regan certainly thinks that we are entitled to self-defence. If I am attacked by a bear, for instance, I 
may kill the bear since this is a case of my life, or the bear’s. And, he might suggest, there are 
probably ways of avoiding conflict over food and disease, by more systematically and efficiently 
separating rodents from our food supplies. But still, it’s possible that if human lives really were at 
stake from threats presented by rodents to our basic resources, killing them would be morally 
permissible, even on a rights view, as a form of self-defence.  
While humans and animals may sometimes be in conflict over resources, on other occasions 
humans deliberately share their resources with particular favoured animals. After all, some animals 
live, by invitation, alongside us, as family members. More than a third of US households includes at 
least one dog; virtually a third includes at least one cat (AMVA 2007). What position does a rights 
view take with respect to pets?  
Actually, there are different answers to this question. Some advocates of animal rights – such as 
Gary Francione (2000) – argue that pet-keeping depends on the idea that pets are human property. 
Since beings with rights should, most fundamentally not be treated as human property, we should 
not keep pets. But on Regan’s account, it’s plausible that, in principle at least, one could live with a 
pet (perhaps ‘companion animal’ would be a better term here) without infringing its rights. After 
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all, a pet is not necessarily being treated ‘merely as a means’ to the ends of the person with whom it 
is living; since one could live alongside an animal while respecting its inherent value. 
However, in practice, pet keeping presents a number of challenges to a rights view. Animals kept as 
pets are frequently confined against their will, and often against their interests. Breeding practices 
may infringe on animals’ liberty, and the creation of some pedigree breeds generates animals unable 
to live healthy lives (albeit in shapes and sizes that are very appealing to people). Spaying and 
castration foreclose animals’ sexual and reproductive freedom and plausibly on this view constitute 
rights infringements (we would certainly think this in the human case, but, of course, it is very 
difficult to know what these freedoms might mean to animals). Many pet animals are fed 
carnivorous diets made out of other animals whose rights have been infringed (it is unclear whether 
all pets can flourish on a wholly vegetarian diet). The freedom to roam of some pets – cats in 
particular – may devastate wildlife; and although (since a cat is not a moral agent, as noted below) 
this doesn’t raise direct issues of the infringements of the rights of individual wild animals, it’s 
difficult to deny that human pet keepers are at least indirectly responsible for their pets’ predation. 
Yet confining a cat indoors may, on a rights view, deprive it of its right to liberty. For all these 
reasons, even though a rights view such as Regan’s does not necessarily condemn the keeping of 
pets in principle, it is likely to be at least uncomfortable with many common pet-keeping practices.  
A rights view, then, allows for self-defence and, in principle, allows us to live alongside animals, 
provided that their rights are fully respected. What, though, about those animals that neither 
threaten us, nor live in our homes – wild animals that live their lives independently of us? What are 
our duties towards them? This issue is often thought to be problematic for rights views (and even 
more so for utilitarian views). For instance, does a rights view imply that humans should defend the 
rights of wild animals against wild animal predators? Should utilitarians promote wild animal 
rescue services, in case of storm or wildfire, to minimize suffering? 
Regan argues that there is no duty to protect animals against threats from other animals. For, he 
maintains, rights only hold against moral agents – that is, those beings that can recognise and 
respect rights. Antelope don’t have rights against lions, because lions are not moral agents; lions 
don’t threaten their rights. So humans don’t have to act to protect antelopes against lions (though 
they should protect them against other people, since people are moral agents, and do threaten their 
rights).  On Regan’s view, humans also don’t have duties to rescue wild animals, or at least not on 
the basis of their rights. Regan suggests that rights provide animals with protections against 
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particular kinds of interference from moral agents (inflicting pain, constraining liberty); this doesn’t 
mean that humans have duties to assist in cases where harm was not caused by a moral agent.  
For utilitarians, though, this issue is more difficult, since utilitarians are concerned to minimize 
suffering or desire frustration, whatever its cause. This does sound like a mandate to act in the wild. 
One utilitarian response is to maintain that acting in the wild to relieve wild animal suffering is 
likely – over time – to cause more suffering than staying out of it, since such actions might disturb 
natural systems. But neither view here is unproblematic; Regan’s rights view seems to have too 
little to say about any kind of assistance (including to distant suffering people); while a utilitarian 
view may imply too much human action in the wild. 
To summarize so far: There is genuine moral disagreement between a utilitarian and a rights view in 
relation to animals. However, there are also points on which both agree. For instance, both maintain 
that the capacities of individual animals are of primary importance in moral decision-making (even 
though they differ on which capacities, exactly, are relevant). In order to decide how to act, we need 
to ask questions such as: Does this being have the capacity to feel pain? Does it have the relevant 
capacities to be an experiencing subject of a life? If the answer is positive, then – providing, in the 
case of utilitarianism, we have some idea of the possible consequences of our actions – we have 
almost complete guidance as to what to do. However, on contextual views, of the kind we’ll now 
consider, this capacities-oriented approach is too narrow, and ignores a range of other important 
factors that are relevant to our ethical duties towards animals. 
 
2.4 Contextual approaches 
Several different positions can be grouped together as contextual approaches to animal ethics. These 
positions share the view that although animal capacities are not irrelevant to moral decision-making, 
and may indeed be very important to it, these capacities are not enough, in themselves, to give 
comprehensive guidance about how we should act. Advocates of contextual views argue that the 
capacities focused on in utilitarian and rights views are very narrowly understood; that utilitarian 
and rights views give no real weight to the different relations that humans have with animals; that 
they have no substantial place for human emotions such as empathy; and that they barely discuss 
the special obligations that humans may have towards particular animals, based on prior 
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commitments to them or prior interactions with them. We’ll consider just two such contextual 
approaches here.  
One kind of contextual approach emphasizes the role of what are sometimes called the moral 
emotions – such as sympathy, empathy and care – in all of our transactions with others, including 
animals. This view - as the philosopher of care, Nel Noddings (1984, p.149) maintains - certainly 
includes responding to animal (and human) suffering, but interprets this somewhat differently to 
utilitarian and rights views: 
Pain crosses the line between the species over a wide range. When a creature writhes or 
groans or pants frantically, we feel a sympathetic twinge in response to its manifestation of 
pain. With respect to this feeling, this pain, there does seem to be a transfer that arouses in us 
the induced feeling, “I must do something”. Or, of course, the “I must” may present itself 
negatively in the form, “I must not do this thing”. The desire to prevent or relieve pain is a 
natural element of caring, and we betray our ethical selves when we ignore it or concoct 
rationalizations to act in defiance of it.  
According to an ethics of care, what is wrong with causing suffering to animals is not primarily that 
suffering is increased (utilitarianism) or that it violates rights (an animal rights view) but that it 
demonstrates a lack of care, or inappropriate emotional response, in the person concerned.  
A view of this kind provides a basis for differentiating between what’s owed to animals in different 
contexts that’s not easily available to a rights or a utilitarian view. So, for instance, people usually 
develop deep emotional relations with their pets, making them sensitive to that particular animal’s 
wellbeing. Because people care for their pets, they protect them from external threats, give them 
veterinary treatment, feed them,  and – as we’ve already noted - frequently understand them to be 
‘family members’. This emotional closeness, however, does not (usually) extend to wild animals; 
where bonds of care and sympathy are much weaker. So, on this account, even though two animals 
might have similar capacities, if human emotional relations to the animals differ, their ethical 
responsibilities will differ too.  
An ethics of care, in this form, is controversial  – in the human, as well as the animal case. Critics 
have pointed out that this view implies that we have no, or very few, duties towards distant 
strangers (both in the human and the non-human case) because we don’t know them personally, and 
so have not developed caring relations with them. In the animal case, this might suggest that, 
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providing we made sure we never encountered animals heading for the slaughterhouse, we could eat 
them without any ethical concern. However, many ethicists of care are unhappy with conclusions of 
this kind, and have argued more recently that we can feel sympathy for the suffering of those we 
never encounter; that sympathy can be extended to strangers – including distant animals. This may 
not generate the intensity of obligation we have towards those to whom we are close, but since even 
distant suffering generates responses of care and sympathy, distant sufferers are nonetheless of 
moral concern. 
Alternative contextual views, however, shift the focus from human emotions to human relations, 
interpreting ‘relations’ to include much more than human emotional responses to particular animals. 
On this approach, for instance, humans have quite different relations – and hence moral obligations  
- to wild animals than to domestic ones. This isn’t primarily due to differing human emotional 
responses (though these may play some part). Rather, it’s because humans are responsible for the 
very existence of domestic animals (unlike wild ones); and additionally, through selective breeding, 
for their natures; frequently natures that render these animals dependent and vulnerable, in ways 
wild animals are not. After all, we think that those who bring dependent and vulnerable human 
children into existence have a special responsibility to protect and provide for them; on this account, 
the same reasoning can be applied to animals. Alongside the creation of dependence and 
vulnerability through breeding and captivity, on this view other human actions also generate special 
obligations towards some animals. Suppose a population of animals has been displaced by human 
development, and is struggling to survive. Since humans have harmed these animals and increased 
their vulnerability, there’s a special obligation to assist them. This kind of special obligation 
wouldn’t exist towards animals struggling due to (say) natural drought or heavy snowfall. In 
summary then, this relational approach takes into account a variety of different factors, in particular 
human interactions with and causal responsibility for the situations of particular animals, before 
coming to a judgment about what obligations there might be in any particular context. 
Of course, complications are generated by this view. One question concerns the way in which 
causal links are supposed to work here. Suppose someone dumps some kittens that they can’t sell. If 
I come across them, am I personally responsible to assist them? The kittens were bred by a human 
and dumped by a human, of course; but am I, on this view, responsible for all the ills committed by 
other people? If human relations to animals are to be thought of as morally significant in the sense 
that this view implies, then a complex account of how to think through individual and collective 
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moral responsibility for the actions of other individuals, and of groups of which one is merely one 
member, is required.   
So while contextualist positions accept that the possession of particular capacities – such as the 
capacity to feel pain – provide a basis for moral status, unlike utilitarian and rights views, they 
maintain that we need to know more than this before deciding how to act. However, utilitarian, 
rights and contextual views do all share one thing in common: a focus on animals as individuals. 
It’s the capacities of individual animals, and/or our relations to individual animals, that provide 
guidance as to how we should treat them. An alternative approach, though, shifts the focus away 
from individual animals towards protecting what’s understood to be natural, and in particular to 
concern about groups perceived to be natural such as wild species.  
 
2.5 Respect for nature 
Moral concern about animals need not be based around the suffering, rights or wellbeing of 
particular individuals;  it is also often expressed about the extinction of species. Indeed, such 
concern often extends to include the extinction of species of plants and insects, where suffering and 
the possession of rights is not an issue. The worry here is about the loss of a particular natural form, 
the species, that’s manifested in each of the individual species members. Here, animals’ value lies 
in their membership of a valued species, not in their individual capacities.  
Although some species are obviously useful or potentially useful to people (for instance as 
resources for medical research) and others are of high symbolic value (such as polar bears) this isn’t 
all that’s at stake here. Some ethicists argue that a species has value in itself, and therefore should 
be protected (both from extinction, and from some kinds of ‘meddling’ in its genetic integrity). This 
kind of value – as Rolston (1989, pp.252-255) maintains below – falls outside the ‘individualist’ 
frameworks we’ve so far been considering, and is thus rejected by them. Holmes Rolston, for 
instance, makes this case:  
Many will be uncomfortable with the view that we can have duties to a collection. ... Singer 
asserts, “Species as such are not conscious entities and so do not have interests above and 
beyond the interests of the individual animals that are members of the species.” Regan 
maintains, “The rights view is a view about the moral rights of individuals. Species are not 
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individuals, and the rights view does not recognize the moral rights of species to anything, 
including survival.” ... 
But duties to a species are not duties to a class or a category, not to an aggregation of sentient 
interests, but to a lifeline. An ethic about species needs to see how the species is a bigger 
event than individual interests or sentience…Thinking this way, the life the individual has is 
something passing through the individual as much as something it intrinsically possesses. The 
individual is subordinate to the species, not the other way round. The genetic set, in which is 
coded the telos, is as evidently a “property” of the species as of the individual. ... 
Defending a form of life, resisting death, regeneration that maintains a normative identity over 
time - all this is as true of species as of individuals. So what prevents duties arising at that 
level? The appropriate survival unit is the appropriate level of moral concern. 
On Rolston’s view, the extinction of a species is deplorable not just because of its consequences for 
the welfare of humans or animals but as something that is in itself bad. If the blue whale becomes 
extinct this is not, after all, a problem for animal welfare – individual whales, for example, do not 
suffer from becoming extinct. For Rolston. it reverses the correct order of things to say that loss of a 
species is bad because it is regretted by humans; rather, humans have duties to protect species – and 
regret their loss - because  species are themselves valuable. Why is this? Rolston argues that a 
species is, in itself, rather like a living individual – a lifeline. A species comes into being, 
reproduces itself, and will eventually die, like any other living individual. Indeed, to push Rolston’s 
argument a bit further, we can even think of a species as having interests distinct from those of its 
members. So, for instance, we could keep all the remaining individuals of a particular species in 
captivity in a zoo for captive breeding: this might produce welfare problems for all those 
individuals, but it might nonetheless be good for the species, allowing it to continue and perhaps 
flourish in the future.  
If the focus of this view is respect for nature, and in particular for natural species, what do those 
who hold such a view think about domesticated animals? The genetic make-up of domesticated 
animals has for countless generations been influenced, shaped and more recently, in some cases at 
least, controlled by human beings. Animals created in these ways are not members of ‘natural’ 
species in the sense that Rolston describes. Indeed, many members of domesticated species would 
find life extremely difficult were they to be taken out of human-created environments and placed 
into natural ones; we might describe such animals as being artefactual as much as natural. 
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 For this reason, some environmental ethicists regard domesticated animals as being less valuable 
than wild ones; The environmental ethicist J.Baird Callicott (1980,p.53) has argued that 
domesticated animals are “living artefacts…they constitute yet another extension of the works of 
man into the ecosystem”.  Unlike wild animals, they are bred to “docility, tractability, stupidity and 
dependency”. Indeed, not only do they lack the value of wild naturalness but they also threaten the 
very beings that do manifest such values, by over-running their habitats.  
One response to views of this kind has been to argue that the wild/domestic divide on which this 
position depends just cannot be so clearly divined. Domesticated animals are still related to wild 
animals; indeed, in Europe some animals are now being bred for ‘de-domestication’, to fit back into 
natural landscapes as now extinct wild animal species, such as aurochs, once did. Some ‘wild’ 
animal species such as squirrels - wild in the sense that no-one has tried to domesticate them – have 
evolved alongside humans over generations. Even the wildest of animal species are now likely to be 
shaped by human impacts, for instance by agricultural expansion and by climate change, impacts 
that will only intensify in the future. Other critics of this view  – such as Stephen Budiansky (1999)- 
argue that domestication should be regarded much more positively than Callicott’s view suggests, 
as a kind of ‘win-win’ contract, of benefit both to humans and to animal species themselves.  
A further concern here may be with the kinds of processes humans use in order to change animal 
species. Someone with a ‘respect for nature’ view might regard all human attempts to change 
animals as morally impermissible, creating artefacts that threaten the flourishing of wild animal 
species. However, others maintain that some processes by which humans adapt animals are more 
‘natural’ and thus more morally acceptable than others. So, for instance, it’s sometimes argued that 
slow, selective breeding, as practised by farmers across the centuries, merely accentuates and guides 
changes that could have happened naturally. These traditional practices, it’s maintained,  are rather 
different from the fast-changing modern ‘engineering’ of animals by genetic modification and 
intensive breeding programmes, where animals are adapted to suit narrow human purposes. On this 
view, selective breeding and domestication, in the traditional sense, is understood to be relatively 
natural and so morally permissible, while genetic modification and intensive breeding programmes 
are understood to be unnatural and morally impermissible. 
Of course – as with the other four positions we’ve considered – positions based on respect for  
nature have been widely challenged. One challenge focuses on the difficulty of identifying what is 
and isn’t natural, given human embeddedness in and entanglement with nature. Another challenge 
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asks why we should think that what’s natural has some special value anyway. From a perspective 
centred on animal welfare, for instance, if a highly artificial process such as genetic modification 
could create animals resistant to certain painful diseases, then it would seem to be morally desirable 
as such a process could reduce animal suffering. Again, then, we see just how far different 
approaches to animal ethics can produce widely divergent views on how we should treat them. 
 
3. Combining views and decision-making 
In this chapter, we’ve outlined a number of different approaches to animal ethics: contractarian 
views, utilitarian views, rights views, contextual views and views concerned for the protection of 
natural species. These different approaches certainly seem to give divergent answers to the 
questions raised at the beginning of the chapter: “Do animals have moral standing in their own 
right? And if so, what kind of duties do we have towards them?” Must we, then, choose to adopt 
one of these approaches (or some other approach altogether) and reject all the others? Or are there 
ways of combining attractive elements from different approaches to create some kind of a ‘hybrid 
view’? 
Some kinds of hybridity do seem plausible. It’s perfectly possible to be morally concerned about 
species extinction while also thinking that the well-being of individual species members is of moral 
significance. And frequently, both species-oriented and individualist views will recommend the 
same policies – protecting a species will usually protect individual members. But on occasions, 
these two values will come apart – for instance, where to protect an endangered species, sentient 
animals of another species would have to be culled. In cases of conflict of this kind, someone who 
held this kind of hybrid view would have to decide which ethical approach had priority. 
Another kind of hybrid view might combine elements of a rights position with a kind of contextual 
view. So, for instance, one might argue that animals’ capacities give them basic rights protections. 
However, this may not tell us everything about our moral responsibilities towards all animals;  our 
relations with particular animals (such as pets) might give us additional special obligations that we 
owe only to a few animals and not (as with respect for rights) to animals in general.  
The ground looks rather fertile, then, for possible hybridization, especially if one view is taken as 
‘baseline’ or given priority in a situation where the different approaches may conflict. However, not 
all views hybridize well. The utilitarian aim at best consequences is in clear tension with the claim 
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of rights theorists that there are some actions we should never do, however good the consequences. 
But even here some form of hybridization might work. For instance, it might be argued that there 
are certain things that may never be done to animals, no matter how beneficial the possible 
consequences – perhaps causing an animal to experience intense and unrelenting suffering. But – on 
this hybrid view - as long as we abstain from these absolutely impermissible actions, we can 
otherwise reason as a utilitarian would. So, for example, painless killing of animals or causing them 
mild distress or inconvenience may be allowed if sufficiently good consequences follow, even 
though severe and unrelenting pain should never be inflicted. 
 
Conclusions 
• Ethical decision-making relating to animals is problematic, highly contested, and requires 
reasoned discussion. A number of competing positions exist. We have outlined five leading 
positions here:  
• The contractarian view only considers human interests. Individual humans belong to a 
human-only moral contract that benefits the individual human concerned, along with other 
collaborating fellow humans.  
• According to the utilitarian view, we should consider not just the interests of all affected 
humans, but also of all affected sentient beings. The aim should be to produce the best 
balance of good over bad, by maximizing the fulfilment of sentient interests. 
• In the animal rights view animals that are sentient and have high-level cognitive abilities 
have rights to life, liberty and respectful treatment. The rights of individuals cannot be 
overridden in order to benefit others.  
• On contextual views, a variety of factors as well as animals’ capacities are of moral 
significance, such as the emotional bonds between humans and animals and the special 
commitments humans have made to particular animals. 
• Finally, in the respect for nature view the protection of natural species, genetic integrity, 
and some kinds of natural processes are thought to be of moral significance; animals are 
valued as tokens of their species. 
• These different theoretical approaches to animal ethics should not be understood as rigid and 
uncompromising. There are, for instance, ways in which they can hybridize with one another. 
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• These approaches can perhaps be thought of as lenses, each focusing in on a different aspect 
of what might be ethically troubling about animals as treated by humans – their suffering, 
their instrumentalization, their vulnerability and dependence, their natural form.  
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